Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap

About the Book

The best military strategy is not always the best political solution. Hoping to avert an unfavorable comparison between the British and much larger United States Army in France, the British sometimes played politics with Allied strategy. The trouble began at a small town in Normandy named Falaise. The fourteen miles between Falaise and Argentan provided the escape route out of Normandy for thousands of German soldiers and became known as the Falaise Gap. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was not successful in keeping the Allied armies focused on their enemy. After the Battle of the Falaise Gap, it became difficult to support the opinion that Allied tactical decisions were being made on the basis of sound strategy. By September 1944, the Anglo-American military alliance was dead, and it required every ounce of General Eisenhower’s considerable political skill to keep this secret from the public.

About the Author

William Weidner was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1941. He attended schools in Carlisle and graduated from Carlisle High School in 1959. He attended Dickinson College in Carlisle and served three years (1963–1966) in the United States Army. He has a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado. He has been employed as a time study engineer, a real estate salesman, a construction project manager, and a home builder. He has two daughters and lives in Grand Junction, Colorado.